Hurricane Florence: Concurrent Causation in North and South Carolina

With formidable winds, tremendous storm surge and prolonged rain, the damage caused by Hurricane Florence will no doubt reignite the age-old debate: what happens when damage is caused by both covered and excluded perils? The two predominant cause tests utilized in multiple cause scenarios are the “efficient proximate cause” test and the “concurrent causation” test. Under the “efficient proximate cause” test, if the efficient proximate cause of the damage is a covered peril, then there is coverage for the damage. Under the “concurrent causation” test, if a covered and excluded peril contribute concurrently to the damage, then the damage is covered, regardless of the degree of damage caused by the respective perils.

In order to avoid the confusion caused by these often convoluted causation scenarios, insurance companies are incorporating anti-concurrent causation language in their policies.  Anti-concurrent causation language typically excludes a loss if an excluded peril contributes concurrently or in any sequence with a covered peril to cause the damage. For example, a typical anti-concurrent causation clause may read as follows: “where an excluded peril contributes directly or indirectly to cause a loss, then coverage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” 

South and North Carolina courts appear to diverge on the proper causation test in these situations.  South Carolina courts appear to have adopted the “efficient proximate cause” test to determine coverage when a covered peril and an excluded peril contribute to a loss. In King v. North River Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 411, 297 S.E. 2d 637 (1982), the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that it was sufficient for coverage “to prove that the event insured against was the efficient cause of the loss, even though not the sole cause.” Id. at 638. In King, the question before the court was whether the proximate cause of a roof collapse was vandalism or malicious mischief when bottles thrown on a roof clogged the roof drains. Id. The court concluded that the expert testimony was sufficient to support the conclusion that the clogging of the downspouts was the efficient and proximate cause of the roof collapse. Id.

While there is little case law since King that addresses the issue, there is no reason to believe that when presented with the issue, South Carolina courts would deviate from this holding. What is less clear is how courts will decide which party bears the burden of apportioning coverage in these situations. In King, supra, the court did not appear to require the insured to allocate the damage caused by the covered peril. In contrast, in Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Ivey, 250 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1957), the court appeared to recognize that the insured was required to provide evidence of the amount of damage caused by the covered peril of wind versus the damage caused by the excluded peril of water. Therefore, the scope of coverage remains unclear under South Carolina law even when a court determines there is coverage under the “efficient proximate cause” test.

Conversely, North Carolina has adopted the “concurrent causation” test. In Avis v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 283 N.C. 143, 195 S.E. 2d 545 (1973), the Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized the general rule that “coverage will extend when damage results from more than one cause even though one of the causes is specifically excluded.” Id. at 549. In Avis, the insureds sought coverage for damage to wood in their house. Id. at 546. The insureds had their home painted, and paint began to blister and peel from some of the woodwork. Id.  The painter tried to remove the paint and repaint it, but the wood would not hold the paint and became damaged. Id. The Supreme Court held that it was not only the inherent qualities of the wood that led to the damage, but the extraneous acts of the painter contributed to the damage. Id. at 549. The court concluded that since the loss was not caused solely by the inherent defect, there was coverage under the all-risk policy. Id. at 550; see also, Erie Insurance Exchange v. Bledsoe, 141 N.C. App. 331, 540 S.E.2d 57 (2000) (excluded peril must be sole cause of damage for damage to be excluded).

The jurisdictional divergence ends at the acknowledgement and enforceability of anti-concurrent causation language.  South Carolina and North Carolina both recognize the effectiveness of anti-concurrent causation language. In South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Durham, 380 S.C. 506, 671 S.E.2d 610, (2009), the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the application of anti-concurrent causation language to a loss in which both covered and excluded perils contributed to the loss. Id. at 613. In Durham, the insured drained its pool of water, and the pool was subsequently lifted by the hydrostatic pressure of the ground water, damaging the pool. Id. at 611. The policy excluded damage caused by the pressure of water below the ground. Id.at 612. The court recognized that both the draining of the pool, a covered cause of loss, and the water pressure contributed to the loss. Id. at 613. The court also recognized the existence of both the “efficient proximate cause” and “concurrent cause” test, but determined that the existence of anti-concurrent causation language contained in the water damage exclusion meant that neither doctrine applied. Id. Instead since the pressure was a cause of the loss, the anti-concurrent causation language meant the entire loss was excluded. Id.

In Builders Mutual Insurance Co. v. Glascar Properties, Inc., 202 N.C. App. 323, 688 S.E.2d 508 (2010), the Court of Appeals of North Carolina also recognized the effectiveness of anti-concurrent causation language. In Builders Mutual, the insured’s home was broken into and vandals left water taps running causing extensive damage, including mold. Id. at 510. The insurer denied coverage for the mold citing an exclusion for fungi. Id. The insured, citing Avis, supra, and its progeny, tried to argue that because there was more than one cause of the loss and one was covered, the entire loss should be covered. Id.at 511. However, the court recognized that none of the cases cited by the insured involved a policy that contained anti-concurrent causation language. Id. While the vandalism may have contributed to the mold loss, the anti-concurrent causation language in the mold exclusion still barred coverage. Id. at 512.

Given the confluence of wind and water that will characterize Hurricane Florence, it is likely that claims arising from the storm will involve more than one peril. To the extent any of the perils is excluded, it will be critical to identify what damage was caused by each corresponding peril in the investigation and adjustment process.  Of course, the first step is to determine the applicable policy language.  If the policy excludes any of the perils causing damage, it is imperative to determine whether the policy contains anti-concurrent causation language. The inclusion of anti-concurrent causation will likely lead to a denial of the claim, assuming that any of the perils is excluded. If there is no anti-concurrent causation language, then the applicable state’s law will dictate whether the causation analysis is driven by the “efficient proximate cause” or “concurrent causation” test.